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	<title>2026 | Membru ESOMAR</title>
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	<title>2026 | Membru ESOMAR</title>
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		<title>MARCH 2026: National Security Barometer</title>
		<link>https://www.inscop.ro/en/march-2026-national-security-barometer/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 10:29:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.inscop.ro/?p=132129</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Download graphical presentation: 19.03.2026 National Security Barometer On March 19, at the Palace of Parliament, the sociological study &#8220;National Security Barometer&#8221; was presented during an event organized by newmoney.ro, the Aspen Institute Romania (AIR) and Strategic Thinking Group. Metodology: The The research conducted by INSCOP Research at the request of Strategic Thinking Group included two [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Download graphical presentation: <strong><a href="https://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/19.03.2026-National-Security-Barometer.pdf">19.03.2026 National Security Barometer</a></strong></p>
<p>On March 19, at the Palace of Parliament, the sociological study &#8220;National Security Barometer&#8221; was presented during an event organized by newmoney.ro, the Aspen Institute Romania (AIR) and Strategic Thinking Group.</p>
<p><strong><em>Metodology: </em></strong><em>The The research conducted by INSCOP Research at the request of Strategic Thinking Group included two waves of collection, during February 23-27, 2026, and March 3-13, 2026, respectively. Research method: interview via questionnaire. The data were collected using the CATI method (telephone interviews), and the sample size was 1100 people for each survey. The samples are representative of significant socio-demographic categories (gender, age, occupation) for the non-institutionalized population of Romania, aged 18 and over. The maximum permissible error of the data is ± 2.9%, at a confidence level of 95%.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648183"></a><strong>Romania&#8217;s level of security</strong></p>
<p>When asked whether Romania is currently a safe or unsafe country in terms of national security, 17.9% of Romanians said it was very safe, 33.2% said it was somewhat safe, 27% said it was somewhat unsafe, and 19.4% said it was very unsafe. The proportion of non-responses is 2.4%.</p>
<p><em>Those who consider Romania to be a safe country in terms of national security are mainly: PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas. The following groups believe that Romania is an unsafe country more than the rest of the population: AUR voters, women, people over 60, people with primary education, and rural residents.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648184"></a><strong>Threats to national security</strong></p>
<p>36.5% of respondents believe that corruption is the main threat to Romania’s national security. 18.9% mention disinformation and manipulation of public opinion (fake news, influencing democratic processes), 10.8% economic instability, 8.1% foreign political influence, and 7.8% a military attack (external aggression against the territory). The energy crisis is mentioned by 4.3% of responders, cyberattacks (on critical infrastructure: power grids, banks, hospitals) – 2.5%, acts of terrorism and sabotage – 2%, espionage – 0.6%, and 2% cite another threat. The share of non-responses is 6.5%.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648185"></a><strong>Romania&#8217;s involvement in a war</strong></p>
<p>36.9% of survey participants say they are very concerned about the possibility of Romania&#8217;s involvement in a war in the coming years (compared to 31% in February). 31.1% are somewhat concerned (compared to 33.1% in February), 6.1% are somewhat unconcerned (compared to 5.2% in February), and 25.2% say they are very little concerned or not at all (compared to 29.1% in February). 0.8% do not know or do not answer (compared to 1.6% in February).</p>
<p><em>Those who are concerned about the possibility of Romania becoming involved in a war in the coming years are mainly: PSD and AUR voters, women, people aged 30 to 44, those with primary education, and rural residents. PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas, and private sector employees are the least concerned about such a prospect.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648186"></a><strong>Political and military alliances</strong></p>
<p>76.8% of those surveyed believe that Romania should orient itself towards the West – i.e. the European Union, the US, NATO, while 10.1% believe that the right direction would be towards the East – i.e. Russia, China. 13.1% do not know or do not answer.</p>
<p><em>PSD, PNL, and USR voters, young people under 30 and people over 60, and residents of Bucharest believe that Romania should orient itself towards the West more than the rest of the population. Those who believe that Romania should orient itself towards the East are mainly: AUR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, and private sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648187"></a><strong>Romania&#8217;s withdrawal from NATO</strong></p>
<p>11.8% of those interviewed believe that Romania should leave NATO (compared to 18.7% in January 2022 and 8.1% in December 2024), while 84.4% believe that the country should not leave the alliance (compared to 76.2% in January 2022 and 88.1% in December 2024). The share of non-responses is 3.8% (compared to 5.1% in January 2022 and 3.8% in December 2024).</p>
<p><em>The following groups believe that Romania should leave NATO more the rest of the population: AUR voters, people aged 30-59, rural residents, and private sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648188"></a><strong>Romania&#8217;s exit from the European Union</strong></p>
<p>22.2% of respondents believe that Romania should leave the European Union (compared to 25.2% in January 2022 and 9.4% in December 2024), while 74.4% oppose it (compared to 71.7% in January 2022 and 88.1% in December 2024). 3.4% do not know or do not answer (compared to 3.1% in January 2022 and 2.5% in December 2024).</p>
<p><em>Those who believe that Romania should leave the EU are mainly: AUR voters, women, and private sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648189"></a><strong>Military actions against Iran</strong></p>
<p>Given the situation in Iran, 11.9% of Romanians believe that the military actions taken by the U.S. and Israel against Iran are very justified. 21.1% believe they are somewhat justified, 26.5% somewhat unjustified, and 21.4% very unjustified. 19% do not know or did not answer.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648190"></a><strong>The expansion of France’s “Nuclear Umbrella”</strong></p>
<p>In the context of discussions about expanding France’s “nuclear umbrella,” 39.3% of Romanians would agree to Romania participating in such a European project, while 51% would oppose it. 9% do not know or cannot say, and 0.7% did not respond.</p>
<p><em>The following groups agree with this European project in greater numbers than the rest of the population: PNL and USR voters, people under 30, those with a college education, and residents of Bucharest and large urban areas. Disagreement is higher than average among: AUR voters, people over 60, and residents of small towns.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648191"></a><strong>Hosting of French nuclear weapons</strong></p>
<p>When asked to what extent they agree or disagree with hosting French nuclear weapons on Romanian territory, 12.6% of survey participants strongly agree. 12.1% somewhat agree, 16% somewhat disagree, and 52.9% strongly disagree. 5.6% do not know or cannot say, and 0.7% did not respond.</p>
<p><em>The following groups agree with the hosting of French nuclear weapons on Romanian territory at a higher-than-average rate: PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of Bucharest. A higher level of disagreement compared to the rest of the population is observed among: AUR voters, people over 60, and those with a secondary education.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648192"></a><strong>Trust in countries</strong></p>
<p>55.8% of respondents have a lot and quite a lot of trust in the USA, 46.8% in the UK, 41.9% in France, 41.7% in Germany and 41.6% in Poland. The Republic of Moldova benefits from a trust capital of 29.9%, Bulgaria – 29.2%, Turkey – 28.6%, and Serbia &#8211; 21.2%. The ranking ends with Hungary with 20.1%, Ukraine with 16.8%, and Russia with 12.6%.</p>
<p><em>Those who trust the US are mainly: PSD and AUR voters, people over 60 years of age. PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas tend to have the most confidence in the UK. The following groups have the most confidence in France: PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, and people with higher education. PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas tend to have the most confidence in Ukraine. AUR voters, young people under 30, and private sector employees are particularly trusting of Russia.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648193"></a><strong>Who would play the main role in repelling an attack?</strong></p>
<p>38.3% of survey participants believe that NATO would play the main role in repelling an attack (through the activation of Article 5). 27.6% indicate the states with which Romania has bilateral strategic partnerships (such as France, Germany, or the United Kingdom), 19.6% indicate the Romanian Army, and 8.6% the European Union (through military cooperation between member states). 5.9% do not know or do not answer.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648194"></a><strong>Compliance with Article 5 of the NATO</strong></p>
<p>Article 5 of the NATO states that if a member country is attacked, the other countries must help it, including militarily. 75.6% of survey participants believe that if Romania were attacked, the US would comply with this obligation. Specifically, Germany – 69.4%, France – 69.3%, the United Kingdom – 63.9%, Poland – 61.7%, and Hungary – 40.6%.</p>
<p><em>Those who believe that the US would comply with its NATO obligation are mainly AUR voters and people over 60 years of age. PSD, PNL, and USR voters, men, people under 30, people with higher education, residents of the capital, and public sector employees are more likely than the rest of the population to believe that Germany would comply with Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Those who believe that France would fulfill its obligations in the event of a military attack are mainly: PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of the capital, and public sector employees. PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of the capital, and public sector employees are more likely than the rest of the population to believe that the United Kingdom will comply with its NATO Article 5 obligation. Those who believe Poland would fulfill this obligation are mainly: PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30 and people over 60, those with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas, and public sector employees. Young people under 30 and public sector employees are more likely than the rest of the population to believe that Hungary will comply with its NATO Article 5 obligation.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648195"></a><strong>Increase in defense spending</strong></p>
<p>75.6% of respondents agree that Romania should significantly increase its defense spending to protect its sovereignty in the event of military aggression, while 21.5% disagree. The proportion of non-responses is 2.9%.</p>
<p><em>Those who agree that Romania should increase its defense spending are mainly: PSD, PNL, and USR voters and people over 60. AUR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, and private sector employees oppose the most an increase in defense spending.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648196"></a><strong>The importance of investment in the defense industry</strong></p>
<p>61.3% of respondents believe that it is very important for the state to support investment in the defense industry. 24.2% believe it is somewhat important, 3.4% somewhat unimportant, and 9.6% very unimportant or not important at all. 1.4% do not know or did not respond.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648197"></a><strong>Arms production in Romania</strong></p>
<p>69.2% of respondents consider that the production of weapons and military equipment in Romania is very important. 19.5% say it is quite important, 6.3% say it is not very important, and 2.7% say it is not important at all. 2.3% do not know or did not respond.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648198"></a><strong>Development of industrial and technological capabilities</strong></p>
<p>69.3% of Romanians consider it very important for Romania to develop its internal industrial and technological capabilities in the defense sector. 22.1% say this is quite important, 3.6% say it is not very important, and 3.3% say it is not important at all. The share of non-responses is 1.7%.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648199"></a><strong>Development of military technologies in the private sector</strong></p>
<p>27.6% of survey participants say they have a lot of confidence in the Romanian private sector&#8217;s ability to develop modern military technologies. 34% say they have quite a lot of confidence, 16.9% have fairly little confidence, and 17.5% have very little or no confidence. 3.9% don&#8217;t know or don&#8217;t answer.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648200"></a><strong>Solutions for ensuring national security</strong></p>
<p>50% of Romanians believe that developing national technologies and production in the field of defense is the most important solution for Romania&#8217;s national security. 14.8% mention resorting to international security guarantees, and 13.3% importing military technology from allies. 12.4% believe that neutrality in terms of military alliances would be the most appropriate option. The proportion of non-responses is 9.5%.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648201"></a><strong>Integration of drones into defense capabilities</strong></p>
<p>When asked to what extent they agree or disagree with investments for the integration of unmanned aerial systems (drones) into Romania&#8217;s defense capabilities, 36% of those interviewed say they agree to a very large extent. 36.2% agree to a fairly large extent, 9.5% to a fairly small extent, and 14.4% to a very small extent or not at all. 4% do not know or do not answer.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648202"></a><strong>Support for companies developing military technologies</strong></p>
<p>When asked to what extent they believe the Romanian state should support public or private companies that invest in modern military technologies, 60.8% answered definitely yes, 27% probably yes, 3.9% probably no, and 6.1% definitely no. The share of non-responses is 2.1%.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648203"></a><strong>Perception of hybrid warfare</strong></p>
<p>33.4% of survey participants believe that Romania is greatly affected by hybrid warfare (disinformation, economic pressure, cyber attacks). 36.8% believe that the country is affected to a fairly large extent, 12.4% to a fairly small extent, and 12.4% to a very small extent or not at all. 5% do not know or do not answer.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648204"></a><strong>Risk of cyber attacks</strong></p>
<p>32.7% of Romanians believe that the risk of serious cyber attacks on public institutions in Romania is very high, 37.5% believe it is quite high, 15.8% believe it is quite low, and 11.5% believe it is very low or non-existent. The proportion of non-responses is 2.6%.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc224648205"></a><strong>Crisis preparedness programs</strong></p>
<p><strong>Courses for drone operators in high schools and technical colleges</strong></p>
<p>When asked whether the state should provide courses for drone operators in high schools and technical colleges, 81.4% of those interviewed agree, while 16.7% disagree. 1.9% do not know or do not answer.</p>
<p><strong>Measures to detect disinformation</strong></p>
<p>88.3% of survey participants believe that the state should offer citizens crisis preparedness programs that include measures for detecting disinformation, while 10% believe that the state should not provide such programs. The share of non-responses is 1.7%.</p>
<p><strong>First aid measures</strong></p>
<p>97.5% of respondents believe that the state should provide citizens with crisis preparedness programs that include first aid measures, while 1.7% believe that the state should not offer such programs. The share of non-responses is 0.8%.</p>
<p><strong>Emergency evacuation procedures</strong></p>
<p>When asked whether they believe the state should offer citizens training programs that include emergency evacuation procedures, 94.4% of Romanians agree, while 4.3% disagree. 1.4% do not know or do not respond.</p>
<p>Download graphical presentation: <strong><a href="https://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/19.03.2026-National-Security-Barometer.pdf">19.03.2026 National Security Barometer</a></strong></p>
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		<title>FEBRUARY 2026: INSCOP Research opinion poll commissioned by New Strategy Center: &#8220;Four years of war in Ukraine. The profound impact on public opinion in Romania&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://www.inscop.ro/en/february-2026-inscop-research-opinion-poll-commissioned-by-new-strategy-center-four-years-of-war-in-ukraine-the-profound-impact-on-public-opinion-in-romania/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 15:15:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.inscop.ro/?p=131751</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Download graphical presentation: 19.02.2026 Survey report NSC &#8211; INSCOP Research &#8211; 4 years of war in Ukraine Today, February 19, a press conference was held at the Intercontinental Athenée Palace Hotel to present the complete data from the sociological  research study &#8220;Four years of war in Ukraine. The profound impact on public opinion in Romania,&#8221; [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Download graphical presentation: <a href="https://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/19.02.2026-Survey-report-NSC-INSCOP-Research-4-years-of-war-in-Ukraine.pdf">19.02.2026 Survey report NSC &#8211; INSCOP Research &#8211; 4 years of war in Ukraine</a></strong></p>
<p>Today, <strong>February 19, </strong>a press conference was held at the Intercontinental Athenée Palace Hotel to present the complete data from the sociological  research study <strong>&#8220;Four years of war in Ukraine. The profound impact on public opinion in Romania,&#8221; </strong>conducted by <strong>INSCOP Research </strong>between January 28 and February 6, 2026, at the request of <strong>the New Strategy Center</strong>.</p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702246"></a><a name="_Toc219402125"></a><strong><u>Internal Agenda</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Direction of the country</strong></p>
<p>22.2% of respondents believe that things in Romania are heading in the right direction (compared to 20% in November 2022, 23.4% in November 2023, 30.3% in October 2024, and 24.1% in November 2025). 73.1% believe that things are going in the wrong direction (compared to 74.8% in November 2022, 68.6% in November 2023, 61.1% in October 2024, and 66.3% in November 2025), and 4.7% do not know or do not answer (compared to 5.3% in November 2022, 8% in November 2023, 8.6% in October 2024, and 9.6% in November 2025).</p>
<p><em>The following are optimistic about the direction of the country: PNL and USR voters, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas. The following groups are particularly pessimistic about the country&#8217;s direction: PSD and AUR voters, people over 60, those with primary education, and rural residents.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702247"></a><strong>Sources of concern</strong></p>
<p>32.2% of Romanians cite corruption as the most important issue that concerns them (compared to 21.5% in November 2023). 23.6% mention rising prices (compared to 23.6% in November 2023), 13.4% mention their own and their family&#8217;s health (compared to 18.1% in November 2023), and 11.7% mention the state of the education system (compared to 14.3% in November 2023). They indicate a lack of jobs – 9.8% (compared to 11.7% in November 2023), the war in Ukraine – 6.9% (compared to 9% in November 2023), and the state of infrastructure – 0.7% (compared to 1% in November 2023). The share of non-responses is 1.6% (compared to 0.8% in November 2023).</p>
<p><em>The following groups choose corruption as their main source of concern: USR and AUR voters, men, people between 45 and 59 years old, those with higher education, residents of Bucharest, and public sector employees. They cite rising prices as the most important issue that concerns them in particular: PSD voters, young people under 30, people with primary and secondary education, and rural residents. PSD voters, people over 60, and those with primary education mention their own and their family&#8217;s health as their main concern more often than the rest of the population. PNL voters and people over 60 in particular consider the war in Ukraine to be the most worrying issue.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702248"></a><strong><u>The war in Ukraine</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>The winner of the war in Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>44.5% of those surveyed believe that Russia will win the war in Ukraine (compared to 26.1% in May 2022 and 32.6% in November 2023), while 23.4% indicate Ukraine (compared to 50.3% in May 2022 and 34.5% in November 2023). 32.2% do not know or do not answer (compared to 23.5% in May 2022 and 32.9% in November 2023).</p>
<p><em>I believe that Russia will win the war, especially: AUR voters and young people under 30. I believe that Ukraine will win the war, especially: PNL and USR voters, women, young people under 30, people with higher education, residents of Bucharest.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702249"></a><strong>Ending the conflict in Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>35.4% of survey participants believe that, in order to end the war, Ukraine should make concessions to Russia (compared to 24.5% in November 2023). 53.3% believe that Russia should withdraw and return the territories to Ukraine (compared to 64.7% in November 2023). The share of non-responses is 11.3% (compared to 10.8% in November 2023).</p>
<p><em>Believe that, in order to stop the war, Ukraine should make concessions to Russia, especially: AUR voters, men, people between 30 and 59 years old, private sector employees. I believe that Russia should withdraw and return the territories to Ukraine, especially: PSD, PNL, and USR voters, women, and young people under 30.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702250"></a><a name="_Toc221702253"></a><strong>Who is to blame for the war in Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>54.9% of those surveyed believe that Russia is to blame for starting the war (compared to 71.2% in May 2022 and 49.8% in November 2023). 14.1% point to Ukraine (compared to 4.5% in May 2022 and 8.8% in November 2023), 7.7% to the US (compared to 10.4% in May 2022 and 14.6% in November 2023), 9% indicate the European Union (compared to 1.7% in May 2022 and 2.9% in November 2023), and 3.5% indicate others. The share of non-responses is 10.8% (compared to 8.3% in May 2022 and 19.4% in November 2023).</p>
<p><em>Those who believe Russia is primarily responsible for starting the war are: PSD, PNL, and USR voters; young people under 30 and people over 60; and residents of Bucharest. Those who believe Ukraine is primarily responsible are: PSD and AUR voters; and people with primary education. People between 30 and 44 years old, those with higher education, and private sector employees point to the US in greater proportion than the rest of the population. AUR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, and those with primary education in particular believe that the EU is to blame for starting the war.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702254"></a><strong>Aid to Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>31.5% of survey participants believe that, in order to resist Russia&#8217;s aggression, Romania should provide Ukraine with humanitarian aid, 10.5% with military aid, and 12.2% with financial aid. 42.6% believe that Romania should not provide any aid, while 3.3% do not know or did not respond.</p>
<p><em>AUR voters, people between 30 and 59 years old, those with primary education, rural residents, and private sector employees believe to a greater extent than the rest of the population that Romania should not provide any kind of aid to Ukraine. They believe that Romania should provide Ukraine with humanitarian aid in particular: PNL and USR voters, young people under 30, people with secondary and higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas, and public sector employees. They believe that the country should provide military aid in particular: PSD, PNL, and USR voters, young people under 30, and those with primary education. PSD, PNL, and USR voters, people with higher education, and residents of Bucharest in particular say that financial aid is the most important type of aid to offer Ukraine.</em></p>
<p><strong><u>Romania and its Allies</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Romania&#8217;s attitude within NATO</strong></p>
<p>If a NATO member state were attacked, 40.9% of those interviewed believe that Romania should fulfill its NATO obligations and provide military assistance to the attacked ally (compared to 51.1% in February 2022 and 51.2% in May 2022). 27.4% believe that Romania should not participate in the war, but should send medical aid and food (compared to 27.7% in February 2022 and 28% in May 2022). 19.6% would choose for Romania to remain neutral (compared to 12.2% in February 2022 and 15.9% in May 2022), while 5.5% would like the country to leave NATO (compared to 6.2% in February 2022 and 3% in May 2022). 6.5% do not know or do not answer (compared to 2.8% in February 2022 and 1.9% in May 2022).</p>
<p><em>They believe that Romania should fulfill its NATO obligations and provide military assistance to its attacked ally, especially: PNL and USR voters, men, people with higher education, and residents of Bucharest. They believe that Romania should not participate in the war, but should send medical aid and food, especially: women, people over 60, and those with primary education. A AUR voters believe to a greater extent than the rest of the population that Romania should remain neutral if a NATO state were attacked.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702251"></a><a name="_Toc221702256"></a><strong>Romania&#8217;s external defense</strong></p>
<p>When asked to what extent they believe various entities/countries would defend Romania in the event of an attack by Russia, 66.6% of respondents indicated to a very large or fairly large extent NATO, 47.7% &#8211; France, 46.6% &#8211; the US, and 44.6% &#8211; Germany, the UK &#8211; 38.1%.</p>
<p><strong>NATO</strong></p>
<p>35.3% of Romanians believe that NATO would defend Romania in the event of an attack by Russia to a very large extent, 31.3% to a fairly large extent, 12.7% to a fairly small extent, and 17% to a very small extent or not at all. 3.6% do not know and 0.1% did not respond.</p>
<p><em>The following groups believe that NATO will defend Romania if the country is attacked by Russia: PSD, PNL, and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, and residents of Bucharest. AUR voters, people between 30 and 59 years old, and those with primary education are the least likely to believe that NATO will defend Romania if the country is attacked by Russia.</em></p>
<p><strong>USA</strong></p>
<p>When asked to what extent they believe the US would defend Romania if the country were attacked by Russia, 18.3% of those surveyed say to a very large extent, 28.3% to a large extent, 17.9% to a fairly small extent, and 29% to a very small extent or not at all. 6.2% did not know, and 0.3% did not respond.</p>
<p><em>The following groups believe that the US would defend Romania if the country were attacked by Russia: PNL voters, men, young people under 30, and residents of Bucharest. USR voters and people between 45 and 59 are the least likely to believe that the US would intervene in the event of a Russian attack on Romania.</em></p>
<p><strong>France</strong></p>
<p>If Romania were attacked by Russia, 23.6% of survey participants believe that France would defend the country to a very large extent, 24.2% to a fairly large extent, 16.2% to a fairly small extent, and 31% to a very small extent or not at all. 5% do not know and 0.2% do not answer.</p>
<p><em>PNL and USR voters, young people under 30 and people over 60, those with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas, and public sector employees are the most confident that France would defend the country if it were attacked by Russia. USR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, those with primary education, and rural residents are the least likely to believe that France would intervene in the event of a Russian attack on Romania .</em></p>
<p><strong>Germany</strong></p>
<p>17.3% of respondents believe that Germany would defend Romania if the country were attacked by Russia to a very large extent, 27.4% to a large extent, 17.4% to a fairly small extent, and 31.6% to a very small extent or not at all. 6.1% do not know, and 0.2% do not answer.</p>
<p><em>PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30, people with higher education, and residents of Bucharest are the most confident that Germany would defend the country if it were attacked by Russia. AUR voters, people with primary education, rural residents, and public sector employees are the least likely to believe that Germany would intervene in the event of a Russian attack on Romania.</em></p>
<p><strong>United Kingdom</strong></p>
<p>14.6% of those interviewed believe that the United Kingdom would defend Romania if the country were attacked by Russia to a very large extent, 23.6% to a fairly large extent, 19.4% to a fairly small extent, and 36.4% to a very small extent or not at all. 5.9% do not know and 0.2% do not answer.</p>
<p><em>Those who believe that the UK would defend Romania if the country were attacked by Russia are mainly: PNL and USR voters, men, young people under 30 and people over 60, and those with higher education. AUR voters, women, people between 30 and 44 years old, and those with secondary education are the least likely to believe that the UK would intervene in the event of a Russian attack on Romania.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702257"></a><a name="_Toc221702264"></a><strong>The possibility of US troop withdrawal</strong></p>
<p>73.1% of respondents have heard about the possibility of US troops withdrawing from Europe and, implicitly, from Romania, while 25.4% have not heard about this. 1.5% do not know or did not respond.</p>
<p><em>Those who have heard about the possibility of US troops withdrawing from Europe, and implicitly from Romania in particular, are: PNL voters, men, people over 45, those with higher education, residents of Bucharest, and public sector employees. The following groups have not heard about the possibility of US troops being withdrawn from Europe and, implicitly, from Romania: AUR voters, women, people aged 18 to 44, those with secondary education, and rural residents.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702265"></a><strong>Attitude towards the withdrawal of American troops</strong></p>
<p>47.9% of those interviewed believe that the possibility of US troops withdrawing from Romania would significantly affect Romania&#8217;s security. 26.2% believe that it would affect the country&#8217;s security, but that US troops could be replaced by troops from European allies, while 19.9% say that it would not affect Romania&#8217;s security at all. The proportion of non-responses is 6.1%.</p>
<p><em>I believe that the withdrawal of US troops from Romania would significantly affect Romania&#8217;s security, especially: PSD and AUR voters, young people under 30 and people over 60, rural residents. I believe it would affect the country&#8217;s security, but US troops can be replaced by troops from European allies, especially: PNL and USR voters, people with higher education, urban residents, and public sector employees. AUR voters, men, and people between the ages of 30 and 59 are more likely than the rest of the population to believe that the withdrawal of American troops would not affect Romania&#8217;s security at all.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702263"></a><strong>Arms purchases</strong></p>
<p>48.6% of those interviewed agree with the statement <strong><em>&#8220;Advanced arms purchases from the US and Europe help strengthen the Romanian Army&#8221; </em></strong>(compared to 48.5% in February 2022 and 50.5% in March 2022). 40.2% choose the statement: <strong><em>&#8220;The purchase of advanced weapons from the US and Europe only helps to increase the profits of arms manufacturers&#8221; </em></strong>(compared to 45% in February 2022 and 41.5% in March 2022). The share of non-responses is 11.2% (compared to 6.5% in February 2022 and 8.1% in March 2022).</p>
<p><em>Those who believe that the purchase of advanced weapons from the US and Europe helps to strengthen the Romanian Army are mainly: PNL and USR voters, young people under 30, and residents of Bucharest. Believe that purchases of advanced Western weapons only help to increase the profits of arms manufacturers, especially: people between 45 and 59 years old, those with higher education, and public sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702267"></a><strong>Trust in international leaders</strong></p>
<p>Donald Trump and Emanuel Macron lead the ranking of trust in international leaders, with 33% of respondents saying they have a lot or quite a lot of trust in the two presidents, American and French (compared to 30.5% and 26.3% respectively in June 2025). The ranking continues with Ursula von der Leyen with a trust rating of 23.7%, Volodimir Zelensky with 23.1%, and Frederick Merz with 20.8%. At the bottom of the list are Victor Orban with 20.5% and Vladimir Putin with 17.5% (compared to 15.6% in June 2025).</p>
<p><strong>Donald Trump</strong></p>
<p>13.9% of survey participants say they have a lot of trust in Donald Trump. 19.1% have quite a lot of trust, 18.9% have quite a little, and 45% have very little or none at all. 1.3% don&#8217;t know or don&#8217;t answer, while 1.7% say they don&#8217;t know him.</p>
<p><em>The American president is trusted most by: AUR voters, young people under 30 and people over 60, those with secondary education, and rural residents. PNL and USR voters, women, people between 30 and 59 years old, those with higher education, and residents of Bucharest and large urban areas have the least confidence in Donald Trump. </em></p>
<p><strong>Emanuel Macron</strong></p>
<p>8.6% of those interviewed say they have a lot of confidence in Emanuel Macron, while 24.3% have quite a lot, 14% quite a little, and 46.6% very little or none at all. 2.6% do not know or do not answer, and 3.8% say they do not know him.</p>
<p><em>The French president is trusted most by: PNL and USR voters, young people under 30, people with higher education, and residents of Bucharest. AUR voters, people between 30 and 59 years old, those with primary education, and residents of the private sector are the population groups that have the least confidence in Emmanuel Macron.</em></p>
<p><strong>Ursula von der Leyen</strong></p>
<p>When asked how much confidence they have in Ursula von der Leyen , 6.4% of those interviewed say they have a lot, 17.2% quite a lot, 14.1% quite a little, and 50.8% very little or none at all. The share of non-responses is 2.9%, while 8.5% say they do not know her.</p>
<p><em>PNL and USR voters, people with higher education, and Bucharest residents tend to have the most confidence in Ursula von der Leyen. Those who have little or no confidence in the head of the European Commission are mainly PSD and AUR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, and those with primary education.</em></p>
<p><strong>Volodymyr Zelensky</strong></p>
<p>When asked how much trust they have in Volodymyr Zelensky, 7% of those surveyed say they have a lot, 16.1% say they have quite a lot, 15.5% say they have quite a little, and 56.5% say they have very little or none at all. The proportion of non-responses is 2.3%, while 2.5% say they do not know him.</p>
<p><em>The Ukrainian president is trusted most by: PNL and USR voters, young people under 30, people with higher education, and residents of Bucharest. PSD and AUR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, those with primary education, and rural residents are the population groups that have the least confidence in Volodimir Zelensky.</em></p>
<p><strong>Friederick Merz</strong></p>
<p>6% of respondents say they have a lot of trust in Friederick Merz. 14.7% say they have quite a lot of trust, 15.3% quite a little, and 38% very little or none at all. The share of non-responses is 3.1%, while 22.9% say they do not know him.</p>
<p><em>The German chancellor is trusted most by: PNL and USR voters, people with higher education, and residents of Bucharest. AUR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, those with primary education, and private sector employees have the least trust in Friederick Merz. </em></p>
<p><strong>Victor Orban</strong></p>
<p>9.8% of survey participants say they have a lot of trust in Victor Orban, 10.7% say they have quite a lot, 17.3% say they have quite a little, and 55.9% say they have very little or no trust. The share of non-responses is 2.7%, while 3.5% say they do not know him.</p>
<p><em>The Hungarian prime minister is trusted most by AUR voters and public sector employees. PNL and USR voters, people aged 30 to 44, those with higher education, Bucharest residents, and private sector employees are the population groups that trust the Hungarian leader the least.</em></p>
<p><strong>Vladimir Putin</strong></p>
<p>8.9% of Romanians say they have a lot of trust in Vladimir Putin, 8.6% quite a lot, 9.6% quite a little, and 70.2% very little or not at all. 1.8% do not know or do not answer, while 0.9% say they do not know him.</p>
<p><em>Vladimir Putin is trusted most by: AUR voters and young people under 30. The Russian president tends to be distrusted most by: PSD, PNL, and USR voters, women, people over 60, and those with higher education. </em></p>
<p><strong><u>Internal benchmarks of national security</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Personal attitude towards war</strong></p>
<p>In the event of a war in which Romania were to be attacked, 48% of respondents would fight to defend their country (compared to 50.5% in November 2023), 19.7% would emigrate from Romania (compared to 19.4% in November 2023), 10.5% wouldwould hide until the war was over (compared to 11.8% in November 2023), 4.7% would obtain a medical certificate to be declared unfit for combat (compared to 5.6% in November 2023), and 7% would do something else (compared to 4.7% in November 2023). The proportion of non-responses is 10% (compared to 8% in November 2023).</p>
<p><em>Those who say they would fight to defend their country are mainly: PNL and AUR voters, men, people between 45 and 59 years old, those with secondary education, and rural residents. Those who believe they would hide until the war is over are mainly: PSD voters, women, people over 60, and those with primary education. USR and AUR voters, people between 18 and 44, those with higher education, and private sector employees are more likely than the rest of the population to say they would emigrate from the country.</em></p>
<p><strong>Romania&#8217;s level of preparedness in the face of a Russian cyberattack</strong></p>
<p>3.6% of Romanians believe that Romania is very well prepared to deal with a Russian attack , 9.9% believe it is fairly well prepared, 31.7% believe it is fairly poorly prepared, and 51.4% believe it is very poorly prepared or not prepared at all. The proportion of non-responses is 3.3%.</p>
<p><em>Those who believe that Romania is prepared to face an attack by Russia are mainly: PNL voters, young people under 30, and residents of Bucharest. AUR voters, people between 45 and 59, those with higher education , residents of small towns, and private sector employees are the least likely to believe that Romania is prepared to face a Russian attack.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702258"></a><strong>Increasing the defense budget</strong></p>
<p>74.4% of those surveyed agree that Romania should increase its defense budget in order to be able to cope with threats and fulfill its obligations as a NATO member state, while 21.2% are against it. 4% do not know or do not answer.</p>
<p><em>Those who agree that Romania should increase its defense budget are mainly: PSD, PNL, and USR voters, residents of Bucharest and small towns. Those who disagree with increasing the defense budget are mainly: AUR voters, people between 30 and 44 years old, residents of large cities, and public sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702259"></a><strong>Introduction of compulsory military service</strong></p>
<p>67.1% of survey participants agree with the introduction of compulsory military service in Romania (compared to 58.4% in May 2015). 30.5% are against it (compared to 31.1% in May 2015), and 2.4% do not know or do not answer (compared to 10.5% in May 2015).</p>
<p><em>Those who agree with the introduction of compulsory military service in Romania are mainly: AUR voters, people over 60, those with primary education, and rural residents. Those who disagree are mainly: PSD, PNL, and AUR voters, men, people aged 18-44, those with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas, and private sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702260"></a><strong>Increasing the level of preparedness of Romanians (I)</strong></p>
<p>When asked if they agree with organizing shooting exercises in high school classes as a measure to increase preparedness in case of war, 48.1% of respondents say yes, 48.8% are against, 2.9% do not know, and 0.3% do not answer.</p>
<p><em>Those who agree with organizing shooting exercises in high school classes as a measure to increase preparedness in case of war are mainly: AUR voters, men, people over 45, and rural residents. Opposed to this idea are: USR voters, women, people between 18 and 44 years old, those with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas, and private sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702261"></a><strong>Increasing the level of preparedness of Romanians (II)</strong></p>
<p>Regarding the introduction of courses for drone operators in high schools and technical colleges as part of measures to prepare citizens for war, 80.8% of those surveyed agree with this initiative, 16.2% disagree, 2.9% do not know, and 0.1% do not respond.</p>
<p><em>Those who agree with the introduction of courses for drone operators in high schools and technical colleges are mainly: PNL and USR voters, people with higher education, and public sector employees. Those who oppose such an initiative are mainly: PSD voters, people between 18 and 44 years old, those with primary education, and residents of Bucharest.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702262"></a><strong>Increasing the level of preparedness of Romanians (III)</strong></p>
<p>92.7% of Romanians agree with the organization of first aid courses for people between the ages of 15 and 60 as a measure to increase citizens&#8217; preparedness in case of war, while 4.6% are against it, 2.5% do not know, and 0.2% do not respond.</p>
<p><em>Those who agree with organizing first aid courses for people between the ages of 15 and 60 are mainly USR voters and those with higher education. Those who disagree are mainly PSD voters, people between the ages of 30 and 44, and those with primary education.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702266"></a><strong>Shooting down Russian drones</strong></p>
<p>72.9% of those surveyed believe that Romania should shoot down Russian drones flying over Romanian territory, while 19.9% disagree. 7.1% do not know or do not respond.</p>
<p><em>Those who believe that Romania should shoot down Russian drones flying over Romanian territory are mainly: PSD and PNL voters, men, people over 60, and residents of Bucharest. Those who oppose shooting down Russian drones are mainly: people aged 30 to 44, those with primary education, rural residents, and private sector employees.</em></p>
<p><a name="_Toc221702268"></a><strong>Sources of information</strong></p>
<p>44.7% of Romanians indicate TV stations as the source of information/news they use constantly. 25% mention social networks, 17.8% news websites, and 5.9% radio. 2.8% prefer discussions with close friends, while 1.4% use WhatsApp. The non-response rate is 2.5%.</p>
<p><em>TV stations are indicated as the source of information/news that is used most consistently by: PSD voters, people over 45, those with primary education, and rural residents. AUR voters, young people under 30, Bucharest residents, and private sector employees get most of their information from social media. News websites are the main source of information/news, especially for: PNL and USR voters, people between 18 and 44 years old, those with higher education, residents of Bucharest and large urban areas, and public sector employees.</em></p>
<p><strong>Methodology: </strong>The survey was conducted by INSCOP Research at the request of New Strategy Center. The data was collected between January 28 and February 6, 2026. Research method: questionnaire-based interview. The data was collected using the CATI ( ) method, with a sample size of 1,100 people. The sample is representative of the significant socio-demographic categories (gender, age, occupation) for the non-institutionalized population of Romania, aged 18 and over. The maximum permissible error of the data is ± 3%, with a confidence level of 95%.</p>
<p><strong>Download graphical presentation: <a href="https://www.inscop.ro/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/19.02.2026-Survey-report-NSC-INSCOP-Research-4-years-of-war-in-Ukraine.pdf">19.02.2026 Survey report NSC &#8211; INSCOP Research &#8211; 4 years of war in Ukraine</a></strong></p>
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